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Abstract: Decentralization policy forms part of a broader global ideology and effort of the 
international donor community in favor of subsidiarity and local participation, and represents a 
paradigm shift from top-down command-and-control systems. Since 2003, the formalization of 
property rights through titling became an integral component of decentralized land administration 
efforts in Ghana. The creation of new forms of local government structures and the related changes 
in the distribution of responsibilities between different levels of government have an impact on 
natural resource management, the allocation of rights, and the unequal distribution of powers. This 
paper aims to understand how decentralization reforms modify the balance of power between 
public administration, customary authorities, and resource end-users in Ghana. Decentralization’s 
impact is analyzed based on two case studies. Relying on purposive and snowball sampling 
techniques, and mixed methods, we conducted 8 key informant interviews with local government 
bureaucrats in land administration, 16 semi-structured interviews with allodial landholders, 20 
biographic interviews and 8 focus group discussions with small-scale farmers. The interviews 
analyzed the institutions and the roles of actors in land administration. Our case studies show that 
decentralization has the tendency to increase local competition in land administration where there 
are no clear distribution of power and obligation to local actors. Local competition and elitism in 
land administration impact the ability of small-scale farmers to regularize or formalize land rights. 
Thus, the paper concludes that local competition and the elitism within the land administration 
domain in Ghana could be the main obstacles towards decentralization reforms. 
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1. Introduction 
Decentralization research has mainly focused on a wide range of public policy issues 
including education, healthcare, waste management, and social policies [1–4]. For roughly 
two decades, the World Bank and other international development agencies have pushed 
for merging objectives of decentralization with land administration and management 
[5,6]. Decentralization in land administration refers to the transfer of land-use (or 
physical) planning, cadastral surveys, land (tenure) regularization, and formalization 
from the central government to the sub-national government level to secure land tenure 
[5–7]. Available records from land formalization programs show that implementing land-
use planning and cadastral survey towards secure land tenure has remained problematic 
[7]. Yet, this is largely unexplored in Ghana [5–7]. In this paper, we aim to appraise and 
highlight how decentralization in land administration and management increase local 
competition among local actors and impact the land rights of small-scale farmers. 
Decentralization in land administration and management is conceptually linked to 
participatory planning and is thus relevant for land-use planning and cadastral survey, 
which in turn influence land regularization and formalization [7]. Since the 1980s, the 
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spread of formalization initiatives emerged in structural adjustment programs to promote 
individualized land ownership for increased land and natural resource sustainability [8–
12]. In the realm of land tenure, formalization is defined as “the administrative recognition 
of occupancy rights–by the state or by local authorities–which results in the delivery of 
personal rights to household living in informal settlements [11,12] (p. 7). It is also the 
“process by which informal tenure is integrated into a system recognized by public 
authorities” [13] (p. 105)]. Public authorities acknowledge a system via “its administrative 
procedure or within the formal planning system” [7] (p. 4). In this regard, land-use 
planning is one of the many planning instruments that offers the rules to permit the 
integration of informal tenure into a system recognized by the government authorities [7]. 
Land-use planning refers to the process of creating a suitable land partition within a given 
local government area to enhance the land rights security of the people or set of people 
living in a particular zone [7,14–16]. It involves a combination of decision-making and 
activity implementation, which modifies numerous plots of land at a time, and 
simultaneously has a link to the plot division process with cadastral (land) survey [7]. The 
land-use planning process engenders land-use decision-making and the division of 
boundary [7]. The division of land into property units permits property rights to develop 
[7,17]. The development of property rights encompasses the division of land into property 
units that are easily distinguishable and protectable through the executive or formal 
decision of relevant authorities [18] (p. 174). Property units are not effectively transferable 
until they are regularized and/or formalized [7]. 
Often, formalization and regularization are used interchangeably, even though they 
mean different things [7,19]. Regularization refers to the “process through which existing 
land rights of people or organizations over different categories of land are recognized, 
guaranteed and secured through the administrative procedure to ensure formalization 
and delivery of land rights to people” [19] (p. 9). Regularization sets up “property 
recognition and permits property right holders to enjoy de facto tenure security”, while 
formalization “sets up property rights to become legalized and allows for de jure tenure 
security to protect property owners” [7] (p. 4). Moreover, “legalizing property formation 
(as the results of formalization) implies making land and property rights to become legal 
by way of land/property rights registration” [7] (p. 4). Both land formalization and land 
regularization are inextricable to post-land-use planning and post-cadastral survey 
activities that aim to give a boost to the tenure security of landowners. 
In Ghana, following the 1999 national land policy and the implementation of the land 
administration project between 2003 and 2016, legislations have been passed to modify 
the Lands Commission as a one-stop-shop for land related services, including the 
mapping and registration of land boundaries of traditional areas and individual land 
rights within traditional areas to enhance the tenure security of resource end-users [20,21]. 
Simultaneously, the Lands Act, 2020 (Act 1036) provides the legal framework for the 
Customary Land Secretariats (CLSs) to identify and demarcate land boundary, to adopt a 
simple land-use planning and plot allocation procedure, and to register customary use 
rights to the land such that they facilitate informal resource users’ initiatives to enhance 
their living conditions [20–26]. 
Paradoxically, however, decentralization creates opportunities for few local 
powerful actors to organize, select, and develop institutions to increase the incentives of 
land administration and management to their own ends [6,21,27]. The theory of New 
Institutionalism in Social Anthropology [28] provides a heuristic approach to understand 
how customary authorities have become very relevant in recent times due to fluctuating 
relative prices of land. The theory postulates that within the context of increasing relative 
prices of land, institutions change in line with the ideology and bargaining power of 
diverse actors, which usually leads to a biased delivery of resources. In this regard, 
decentralization and structural adjustment programs together with a rise in land values 
tend to reinforce the bargaining power of customary chiefs who can manipulate their 
position as trustees of customary land and change it into de facto private property via the 
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performance of ‘institution shopping’ [29,30]. In respect of legal pluralism, the phrase 
‘institution shopping’ describes how powerful actors resort to various institutions (i.e., 
customary and non-customary laws) to expedite their access to resource in a more 
legitimate way [21,29–32]. The theory argues that “institutional change usually creates 
both winners and losers” and “winners have an obvious interest in promoting such 
change; losers have an interest in resisting it” [28] (p. 166). 
This paper aims to understand how decentralization reforms modify the balance of 
power between public administration in charge of land administration, customary 
authorities, and resource end-users. Specifically, we ask: which new institutional 
arrangements that regulate land administration emerge at the local level? What are the 
implications of the institutional arrangements on the land rights of small-scale farmers? 
In this paper, institutional arrangements refer to the formal government organizational 
structures and informal norms put in place at all levels of government (federal, provincial, 
and local) for arranging and undertaking its policy work [4]. The paper follows two lines 
of arguments: First, we demonstrate that decentralization has the tendency to increase 
competition among local actors in land administration because power and responsibility 
are transferred downwardly to heterogenous actors with diverse interests. As such, 
customary authorities seize the opportunity of the withdrawal of the central state from 
local matters to reinforce their nondemocratic identity even more through strategies based 
on fait accompli leading to negative consequences on the land rights of small-scale farmers. 
Second, we demonstrate that the elitism within the formal land administration domain 
could be the main obstacle towards decentralization reforms. 
Bole and Talensi cases in northern Ghana present an interesting basis of comparison 
because they allow us to observe how the impact of decentralization has evolved in rural 
areas with distinct social and institutional conditions [2]. The cases represent a range of 
experiences with the subsidiarity principle, from chaos to a partial working 
decentralization. We assume that a variance may influence the analysis of the outcome 
and the impact of decentralization reform processes [2,4,9]. The cases were also chosen 
based on the differences in traditional political system, which shape land relations amidst 
state laws, rules, and regulations [9,33,34]. 
The following section provides an overview of the institutional shift towards 
decentralized land-use planning and cadastral survey, and the subsequent administrative 
efforts to secure land (rights) tenure through regularization and formalization. Section 3 
describes the materials and methods used for the comparative study. The case studies are 
outlined in Section 4 to illustrate how the institutional arrangements work with as well as 
against land administration. In Section 5, we analyze the actual impacts of 
decentralization policies at the local level. In Section 6, we synthesize the theoretical and 
empirical insights into a broad argument about decentralization reforms. We present the 
conclusion in Section 7 with emphasis on new forms of formalized collective tenure that 
build on common property relations. 
2. The Institutional Shift towards Decentralization in Land Administration and 
Management 
The key elements of land administration and management include land-use 
planning, cadastral survey, regularization, and formalization. This section focuses on 
these key elements to show how they are ingrained in western style of complex legal and 
technical standards or ethics, which end up downgrading the social cultural relations and 
the existing land tenure arrangements of the rural population and concurrently increase 
the bargaining power of government bureaucrats. 
2.1. Decentralized Land-Use Planning and Cadastral Survey in Perspective 
Decentralization reforms are part of a broader project initiated by the World Bank as 
a paradigm shift from top-down command-and-control systems. In 1988, Ghana’s 
decentralization policy was launched to transfer power, functions, and responsibilities 
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regarding land use and spatial planning from the central government to the district 
assembly or spatial planning authority [35–37]. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the Local 
Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) and the Land-Use and Spatial Planning Act, 2016 (Act 
925) provide the legal framework of Ghana’s decentralization policy [35]. The 1992 
Constitution designates the district assembly as the highest planning authority at the local 
level. The district assembly is responsible for physical/spatial planning of customary land 
in conjunction with customary authorities, granting approval of all planning schemes 
before they can take effect and granting of planning and building permits to control 
development [35–37]. Ghana’s decentralization policy aims to ensure effective 
participation of local citizens in land-use planning to enhance the judicious use of land to 
improve quality of life, promote health and safety in respect of human settlement [6,35,38].  
Land-use planning or physical planning is the “planning instrument employed by 
government agencies (or instituted authorities) to regulate how land and natural 
resources are used” [7] (p.4). Since physical planning relates to decisions and activities, it 
makes it a regulator of property rights within the framework of their applications to land 
use [7]. As such, issues related to plot divisions, regularization and formalization are 
influenced by land-use planning [7].  
Over the years, the Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD) has been 
responsible for land-use planning to ensure the orderly and progressive development of 
human settlement, and the provision of layout plans (planning schemes) [35]. Planning 
schemes are important in the concurrence process by the Lands Commission as part of 
registration of title [20,33]. With planning schemes, potential differences between planned 
layout, the actual location on the ground and ownership claim can be identified and fixed. 
Structure plans provide information about the future general land use within a specified 
local government area. Structure plans are the main legal planning documents with zones 
of development that are approved by a technical and political process [35]. They are 
usually prepared by land-use planners in consultation with major landowners, 
developers, utility companies and the district assemblies [35]. The tools to implement 
structure plans are local plans, which form the basis for parcel administration, land use 
management and permit issue.  
A local plan identifies detailed land uses down to parcel level. They require strong 
community participation so that land holders and users can specify their land (tenure) 
rights and boundaries based on their individual views [39]. Yet only few selected local 
citizens get to participate due to the “strict standards and quality assurance specifications” 
[40] (p.3). For example, the use of Global Navigation Satellite System, Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles and Mobile app for spatial data collection are too technical for local citizens to use. 
As a result, local plans are set up by qualified and registered architects, engineers, 
developers, together with land-use planners and the Geographic Information System 
experts. Therefore, land holders who want to develop land for sale are required to engage 
technical experts to develop local plans for approval by the local, technical, and political 
authorities before being implemented [41].  
As land-use planning comprises decision-making and activity implementation, it has 
connection to a cadastral survey [7]. In this regard, the TCPD collaborates with the Survey 
Department to prepare acquisition plans when stool or skin land is being acquired [18]. 
Oftentimes, registered private surveying firms are engaged in the (sub)division of parcels 
into property units to enable disposition [7,18]. The TCPD in consultation with the Lands 
Commission provide a referenced coordinate system with the district assembly uses as 
the basis to provide a unique parcel number of each parcel of land “The division of land 
into property units serves to “individualize objects of ownership and other rights in land” 
including privileges, obligations and interest [42] (p. 58). Land divisibility makes it 
possible to be titled, possessed, or co-possessed, and be transferred from person to person, 
person to a group, or from a group to a person [7]. Note that ownership, responsibilities, 
privileges, and interests can be transferred either in whole or components from one form 
or person to another [7,12,42,43]. Land regularization and formalization enable 
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transferability. The idea of “transferability or property (land) rights from person to person 
is what makes property rights, together with its associated institutional arrangements”, 
‘strong’ drivers in the use of land and natural resources use and tenure” [44] (p. 25). Thus, 
property rights can be termed as a bundle of many (sticks) rights, including the right to 
use the property, to obtain income from the property, and to alienate the property [45]; or 
the rights of access, withdrawal, exclusion, management, and alienation [46]; or privileges, 
interest and obligations, which the formal law on any occasion grants to the owner of a 
property unit relative to other persons [7].  
In summary, land-use planning and cadastral survey are regulated by high 
professional ethics or standards and strict legal requirement. As a result, public authorities 
perform such functions with weak participation of local citizens. This is highly 
unexpected considering that decentralization reforms aim to empower local citizens in 
land administration to feel a sense of ownership [40]. Considering the weak participation 
of local citizen in land-use planning and cadastral survey, we examine the systems 
through which property (land) rights are regularized or formalized in Ghana in the next 
section to see if they offer possibilities for local citizens to be involved.  
2.2. The Administrative Procedure of Land (Tenure) Regularization and Formalization 
A title to land refers to the legal proof of ownership of real property [43,47–50]. A 
good land title is one that is stemmed from an enactment, a vesting order or conveyance 
from the state, a final judgement of a court, or an acquisition under customary law 
[9,40,47,50,51]. Title registration is done by any individual who is the allodial owner, holds 
a common law freehold or a customary freehold, and has usufructuary interests, a 
leasehold interest, or a customary tenancy [40,47,50,51]. The rights that are registrable in 
relation to land include a mortgage, an easement, a restrictive covenant, a power of 
attorney, a contractual license, a profit a prendre, and a user right under a certificate of 
allocation [50]. The registrable interests in land are an allodial title, a common law 
freehold, a customary law freehold, a usufructuary interest, a leasehold interest, a 
customary tenancy, and an interest in a condominium. A condominium refers to a single 
estate unit in a multi-unit development in which a person has both a separate legal right 
of ownership to the real property and a common interest with others [52]. An allodial title 
is the highest interest in land and is held by the state, a stool or skin, a clan or family, or 
an individual, and may be acquired through a compulsory acquisition, a first discovery 
and settlement, a gift, a purchase, or an agreement [26,50]. 
The bundle of rights and obligations that attach to any form of interest in land is 
based on the applicable source of law which forms the basis of that interest [26,53,54]. Act 
1036 spells out three systems for the recording and registration of land and interests in 
land. These are the recording of customary interests and rights by the customary land 
secretariat; the registration of instruments relating to land; and the registration of title, 
interests, and rights in land by the State’s Lands Commission [50].  
Following the successes of the Akyem Abuakwa’s land secretariat in Kyebi in the 
Eastern region, the Asantehene’s land secretariat in Kumasi in the Ashanti region, and the 
Gbawe Kwatei family’s land secretariat in Accra in the Greater Accra region of Ghana [22–
26], the land administration project recommended for the establishment of the customary 
land secretariats across the country to maintain a register of written and oral grants at the 
local level [22]. The secretariats receive, sign and stamp plot allocation papers issued at 
the village level after land purchase [51]. Section 17 of Act 1036 empowers the secretariats 
to charge and collect fees for the services that it renders to land buyers [50]. The plot 
allocation papers, which are prepared by customary chiefs usually contain the name of 
the grantor, the town/village where the land is situated, the layout/ward/block, the plot 
number, and the allotee name and address. In some cases, the conditions for the land are 
stated in the allocation papers, which the allotee must abide by, including entering into a 
formal lease agreement with the paramount chief of the traditional area within six months 
from the grant on terms mutually agree upon. The plot allocation papers do not contain 
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spatial information of the land purchased and as such not likely to convey title to the 
allottee [40,50]. The plot allocation papers provide evidence of land ownership and is 
relied on to adjudicate local land disputes [32,51,55].  
The secretariat is also responsible for part of the procedures to formalize land under 
the customary tenure at the Land Registration Division of the Regional Lands 
Commission by issuing the above-mentioned plot allocation papers [32,51]. Formerly, to 
obtain a formal land title (or title certificate), people would have to deal directly with the 
Land Title Registration in Accra, the national capital. In the new system, the Land 
Registration Division receives the plot allocation paper issued by the customary land 
secretariat together with a site plan from the Town and Country Planning Department 
(TCPD) and a cadastral plan from the Survey Department. The Registrar would scrutinize 
all the relevant documents submitted and ensures that the processing fees are paid before 
a title certificate is prepared, signed, sealed, and issued out to the applicant.  
Available records show that a little over 30,000 parcels have been titled by urban elites 
in Ghana [22,40]. To facilitate title acquisition by rural citizens, several programs have been 
developed, including a systematic titling project by the Millennium Development 
Authority, a paralegal titling project by the Corporate Initiative Development Group, a 
Medeem Proprietary ParcelCert, a LandMapp Initiative, and the Community-Based Land 
Survey Tool by the Land Resource Management Center [22,40]. Paralegal titles can be 
converted into formal titles [40]. Furthermore, while the application procedure for 
formalization now begins at the lower level than in the past, the ultimate issuing out of titles 
takes place at the regional level and requires expensive outside expertise in the form of 
professional surveyors. In addition, there have been very little efforts to promote and 
reinforce the public image of plot allocation paper, which is the only evidence of land 
ownership hand out by the customary authorities at local level [32,51,55]. 
In the light of the different registration systems performed by the land secretariats 
and the Regional Lands Commission [8,9,53,54], resource end-users select forums to 
register their land rights “based on accessibility, efficiency, legitimacy, jurisdiction and 
cost”, as well as the forum’s capacity to provide asset protection [53] (p. 44). In the 
following section, we describe the methods employed for the data collection to enable the 
comparative analysis.  
3. Materials and Methods 
3.1. Case Selection 
The Bole case in the savannah region is characterized by a formal recognition of 
customary chiefs as sole authorities in the customary land secretariat to grant consent and 
concurrence in local land transaction [10,20,33,40]. Article 267 of the 1992 Constitution of 
Ghana acknowledges the de facto power of a customary chief to govern skin or stool lands 
in accordance with customary law. The CLS is responsible for managing all land held 
under customary land tenure system [40]. The Talensi case in the upper east region is 
characterized by the absence of the customary land secretariat due to multiple customary 
authorities laying claim to the land [10,33]. In Talensi, the customary chiefs lay claim to the 
land based on the British colonial land legislations and the land administration project. 
Based on the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of Ghana, first discovery and 
settlement, the tindanas lay claim to the land [26,31,34,38], while settlers lay claim to the 
land based on usufruct [38,56]. As such, little is done by way of survey and mapping of 
parcel boundaries when registering land [40].  
3.2. Methods 
We obtained our field data from Dokrupe and Tinga for our Bole case, and Datuku and 
Gbani for our Talensi case to enable a comparative analysis. The field data were gathered 
between February 2019 and February 2021. We used the purposive sampling technique to 
choose our respondents (small-scale farmers, customary authorities, registered surveying 
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firms and local government authorities) based on their respective activities, experiences, 
knowledge and obligation in land administration and management. We applied the 
snowball sampling technique to make sure that the right small-scale farmers who were 
involved in land-use planning, regularization and formalization, and the government 
authorities who facilitated the approval of local plan at the local level were chosen [7,57]. 
We relied on the mixed methods approach, including key informant interviews, 
semi-structured interviews, biographic interviews, and focus group discussions (FGDs) 
to collect the relevant data for the study [10]. Eight key informant interviews were 
conducted with local government bureaucrats in land administration to share their 
knowledge, experiences and roles in land-use planning, plot demarcations and title 
processing. The interviews with the private surveying firms centered on how they 
gathered spatial data and verified the rights of individuals on the ground before plot 
demarcations. Also 16 semi-structured interviews (made up of both closed-ended and 
open-ended questions) were conducted with the allodial landholders comprising of 4 
customary chiefs, 4 tindanas, 4 clan and 4 family heads to understand the power dynamics, 
social norms, and rules governing land boundary adjudication and the filing of informed 
consent for land-use planning to happen. The interviews analyzed the local power 
dynamics hindering the operations of the customary land secretariat. In addition, 20 
biographic interviews were held with small-scale farmers to uncover the nature of 
participation in land-use planning, how individual plots were partitioned, and the 
challenges faced in regularizing plots at the customary land secretariat or formalizing at 
the Regional Lands Commission. Furthermore, 8 FGDs were conducted with a total of 72 
selected small-scale farmers (both men and women) to triangulate the individual views 
expressed privately. We also augmented our empirical qualitative data with published 
journal articles on decentralization, participatory land-use planning, formalization 
programs and cadastral survey [7,10,16,17,40]. We reviewed legal documents, including the 
Acts of Parliament, relevant chapters of the 1992 Constitution, national land policy and 
unpublished documents from the land administration project. 
3.3. Data Processing, Analysis and Presentation 
We recorded all the interviews and focus group discussions on our field diary and 
notes. The field data were subsequently coded according to major themes and concepts 
such as affordability and participation to make our comparative analysis. The assessment 
elements were participation in land-use planning, cadastral survey, regularization, and 
formalization. Some of the indicators were the ability to collect spatial data, the ease of 
use of the spatial data collection technology, and the cost of surveying and processing 
title. The descriptive technique for data analysis was used, and discoveries were 
represented in tables and texts under key thematic areas [7]. In the next section, we 
describe the context of the two case studies, concentrating on the history of customary 
land administration and management. 
4. The Case Study: Decentralized Land Administration and Management 
In this section, we outline the history of land administration and management from 
the precolonial to the postcolonial era in the Bole and Talensi case studies to show the 
institutional arrangements that work with as well as against. 
4.1. Customary Land Secretariat for Land Administration and Management in Bole 
The roles of customary chiefs in customary land administration and management 
have not changed in the Bole traditional area since the precolonial era. Instead, it is being 
reinforced by colonial and post-colonial land legislations and policies [56]. During the 
precolonial era, land was abundant and available for everyone to use under the common 
property regime [26,34]. Settler farmers presented kola nuts to the village chief to obtain 
use rights. The village chief had to direct the land priest to find suitable plots for strangers 
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to develop [34]. The strangers often planted trees of marginal economic value on the plots 
to serve as evidence of land use and occupation. As land gained economic value due to 
the opening of commercial agriculture beginning in the colonial era, people’s “free” access 
to the land diminished [26]. As a result, customary authorities began to introduce 
discriminatory rules of access to land for the Ngbanya (people of royal descent), the kramo 
(the Muslim group), and Nyamasa (the settlers) [34]. Unlike females, adult male Ngbanya 
exercised most of the rights usually associated with land ownership [34]. The Nyamasas’ 
access to land depended on social capital and relational reciprocity.  
In recent times, population pressure and global land rush are contributing to 
weakening the security of tenure of rural landowners [14,15,21,25]. This is partly due to 
lack of formal titles and proper plot demarcations at the local level, leading to several land 
boundary conflicts [25,56,58]. The local government authorities appear very weak to 
safeguard the land rights of rural landowners from intrusion by rural newcomers [26,56].  
In this regard, the Bole Traditional Council—an assemblage of king makers, elders, 
and divisional chiefs in the traditional political system [59]—inaugurated a 16-member 
land management committee to operate the customary land secretariat [22]. Through the 
help of the customary land secretariat, it is anticipated that the individual land rights 
within the traditional areas would be registered and mapped [21]. As such, rural 
communities invigorated land-use planning to improve tenure security to promote 
human settlement [41]. Since the establishment of the customary land secretariat, over 
7000 land transactions have been regularized, and over 100 land boundaries disputes 
resolved [22]. The successes are attributed to the development of local plans by 
landowners with support from the Town and Country Planning Department and the 
district spatial planning committee [22].  
4.2. Multiple Customary Authorities in Land Administration and Management in Talensi 
Talenteng (Talensi Traditional Area) has gone through three phases of institutional 
arrangements in customary land administration. Before 1930 (phase 1), land control and 
allocation were the prerogative of the tindanas and was often combined with performing 
the rituals for land use [34]. The tindanas had duly exercised that authority in the time 
when the economic value of land was not profitable and demand for land was low 
[26,34,56]. The tindanas, in consultation with family members, granted land use rights to 
settlers. In the eyes of the British colonial administration, the tindanas were inefficient in 
land regulation and quality natural resource management [26,38].  
By the 1940s (phase 2), the colonial administration appointed chiefs in Talenteng and 
took land control and alienation rights away from the tindanas, and gave these rights to 
the chiefs. This resulted in some families losing their land to the chiefs [26,34,56]. The 
chiefs were granted supervisory, jurisdictional, and territorial control of the people, land, 
and related natural resources in Talenteng on behalf of the colonial government [27,35,57]. 
The commissioner made the chiefs more business-orientated to increase their efficiency 
and effectiveness [26,56]. Since the 1980s, land alienation was no more than the exclusive 
right of the tindanas [26,31,33,34,38]. This is because after the 1979 Constitution of Ghana, 
the tindanas, clan and family heads made claims on land ownership, land title, and the 
right to alienate land [31,34,38]. Subsequently, individuals and heads of clans and families 
exercised control over land under clan or family ownership, while the chiefs and tindanas 
exercised control over land subject to collective rights, such as grazing or hunting grounds 
[21,31,38]. Each of the customary authorities kept to their exclusive functions, a situation 
which fostered a cordial relationship among them, and by extension, accounted for a 
nonviolent atmosphere in Talenteng [34].  
From 2003 onwards (phase 3), the national government’s land administration project, 
which introduced the CLS for improved land administration and management, was 
rejected by selected local actors [10]. The tindanas have resisted the creation of the CLS, 
which pave the way for landowning families to individually prepare local plans for the 
land. With the increase in the value and demand for land and related natural resources, 
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the tindanas, having compromised in the past, have now rejected their downgrading, and 
want to re-assert their rights as landowners. This complexity puts to test the extent to 
which the adoption of western style of decentralization affects local land administration. 
In the next section, we present the institutional arrangements and their implications on 
land rights of small-scale farmers. 
5. The Institutional Arrangements in Land Administration and The Implications on 
Land Rights of Small-Scale Farmers 
In this section, we compare the similarities and dissimilarities of the institutional 
arrangements in Bole and Talensi cases and show how they affect the participation of local 
actors in land-use planning, cadastral survey, regularization and formalization. The 
empirical findings are presented separately beginning with the Bole case and followed by 
the Talensi case. 
5.1. Bole 
5.1.1. Participation of Local Actors in Land-Use Planning and Cadastral Survey 
Since decentralization seeks to empower local actors in land administration, this 
section examines the nature of involvement or participation of local actors in land-use 
planning and cadastral survey leading to plot boundary creation. Land-use planning and 
cadastral survey in rural communities aim to promote formal and efficient land 
development. Formal land development deals with the administrative and lawful way of 
developing and occupying land [7]. Formal land development involves a sequence of 
activities, including physical planning, formal land acquisition, cadastral survey, supply of 
basic infrastructure and services on land and occupation of developed plots or parcel [7]. 
However, oral history indicates that Dokrupe and Tinga were informal settlements 
occupied since the 1930s and 1970s, respectively (Customary chief in Tinga, Semi-
structured interview, 7 March 2019). Informal settlements are characterized by informal 
land acquisition and unplanned land use leading to haphazard creation of houses, shops, 
gardens, and farms. As a result, in 2015, the district assembly, the Town and Country 
Planning Department (TCPD) and the customary land secretariat (CLS) began processes 
to upgrade unplanned traditional settlements to a planned status that would ensure the 
standardization of land parcels, which will eventually lead to land regularization and 
formalization [6]. The upgrading of the settlements was in response to population 
pressure, modernity, community orderliness and tenure security. Upgrading provided a 
forum for state and non-state actors to dialogue and negotiate in land-use planning to 
tackle land boundary conflicts and to pave the way for formal land acquisition and its use 
within the government’s legal framework [7]. As such, allodial landowners and resource 
end-users were sensitized and educated on the importance and advantage of land-use 
planning and plot demarcation (Customary chief in Tinga, Semi-structured interview, 7 
March 2019). The entire process of land-use planning was led by the TCPD and involves 
planning, drawing, and giving opportunities to community members to list the reasons 
for which people use the land (Chairman of the land committee in Tinga, FGD, 10 Mach 
2019). The flexibility of the land-use planning process ensured that the various interests, 
vision, concerns and needs of the different segments of the rural population were 
considered in the plan. The participants, for example, assented for the creation of 
additional access roads and public open space zones–parks and gardens, small play areas 
for children, and open area buffers between industrial and other land use activities 
(Director of TCPD in Bole, Key informant interview, 19 March 2019). The TCPD also 
ensured that the planning standards of the parcel size and width of the development 
zones conformed to the Town and Country Planning Ordinance (Cap 84) and the 
Environmental Protection Agency guidelines (Director of TCPD in Bole, Key informant 
interview, 19 March 2019). 
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Land-use planning led to the creation of plot boundaries and plot shapes which 
formed the basis for land use and property rights [6]. The lines that created the plots on 
the land-use plan were executed by a registered private surveying firm (Chairman of the 
land committee in Dokrupe, FGD, 13 April 2019). The creation and recording of new plot 
boundaries paved the way for the formation of new property rights in the communities 
[7]. According to Lai [60], “spatial partition of land whether by governments or private 
bodies, which involves decision on boundary delineation” enables the creation of 
property rights (p. 619). The demarcation of plot also enables land buyers to determine 
the size, location, and access to the plot before buying. The way and manner land-use 
planning and plot demarcation facilitate property transfer support previous studies by 
Gwaleba and Chigbu [7]; Lai et al. [60]; MacMahon [61]; and Roose et al. [62]. In all, the 
realization of land-use planning and cadastral survey was due to the participation of local 
actors and their distinct roles. 
5.1.2. Actors and Their Roles in Land-Use Planning and Cadastral Survey 
Table 1 shows the different groups of actors and their roles in land-use planning and 
cadastral survey. The actors involved are grouped into primary actors, secondary actors, 
and tertiary actors. The primary actors are based at the community level, and comprise of 
the village chiefs, the village land committees, and the customary land secretariat. The 
village chiefs settled and verified the land boundaries of clans and families and 
documented their consent prior to the preparation of the conceptual layout plan (Village 
chief in Tinga, Semi-structured interview, 7 March 2019). The village chiefs also oversaw 
the organization of community consultations and determined which lineage members and 
youth group leaders would be appointed to constitute the village land committees based 
on patrimonialism [10]. The village chiefs’ unilateral appointment of members of the 
village land committee resulted in a skewed distribution of positions in the land-use 
planning process. The land committee is only accountable to the village chiefs because he 
appointed them (Small-scale farmer in Dokrupe, FGD, 27 April 2019). 
The secondary actors were the district assembly/spatial planning committee, the 
technical sub-committee, the TCPD, and a private surveying firm. Except the private 
surveying firm, the secondary actors are based at the district level. The TCPD was the lead 
actor in land-use planning. The TCPD prepared and presented the conceptual plan to the 
local communities to deliberate. The district assembly approved the layout for 
implementation in the communities. A private surveying firm based in Tamale, the regional 
capital of the northern region, was engaged by the village chiefs and the land committees to 
demarcate the new parcel borders and to prepare a cadastral plan (Village chief in Tinga, 
Semi-structured interview, 4 January 2021). The tertiary actors are the Survey and Mapping 
Division and the Land Registration Division of the Regional Lands Commission. The land 
registration division prepared title certificates for land buyers based on cadastral plan. 
Overall, the actors played complementary roles. In spite of that the actors expressed 
different views about the nature of collaboration in land-use planning and cadastral survey. 
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Table 1. Local actors and their roles in land-use planning and cadastral survey in Tinga. 
Actors Role 
 Primary actors 
Village chiefs 
 Form village land committees  
 Document the consent forms of landowners during the land 
boundary settlement process 
 Organize community meetings for public sensitization, awareness 
creation, and education on land-use planning, and to discover the 
needs, concerns, and interests of the community  
 Issue plot allocation papers to buyers  
 Pay cash and in-kind for cadastral surveying activities 
 Submit application to the district assembly to prepare local plan 
 Register the local plan at the RLC 
Village land 
committee 




 Regularize individual land rights 
 Charge and collect fees for land regularization  
 Secondary actors 
Private 
survey firms 
 Undertake mapping activities to certify that the lines drawn by the 
TCPD are genuinely implanted on land parcels 





 Participate in meetings arranged by the village chiefs 
 Monitor and supervise the land-use planning process 
 Gather reliable spatial data from the communities for detailed land-







 Maintain local plan at the public data room for public inspection 
 Receive public complaints concerning local plans  
 Provide administrative support to the technical sub-committee 




 Regulate the private surveying firm’s practice of cadastral survey  




 Issue title certificates to land buyers 
Source: Qualitative methods and review of relevant literature. 
5.1.3. The Different Views of Actors in Participatory Land-Use Planning and Cadastral 
Survey 
In this section, we present the different views and assessments of the actors in the 
land-use planning process and cadastral surveying. In general term, there was a strong 
feeling of effective collaboration in land-use planning centered on the five elements of 
collaboration, namely “information sharing, active engagement, consultation, delivery 
and monitoring of local citizens” [14,58]. The private surveying firm was of the view that 
it took too much time to explain technical issues of cadastral survey to the local citizens, 
which suggests information sharing between local citizens and surveyors. He added that 
the time spent to explain survey issues resulted in a plan implementation delay at the local 
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level (Private surveyor in Tamale, Expert interview, 10 January 2021). The surveyor 
acknowledged that participatory cadastral survey enhanced local knowledge, experience, 
and skills development, and helped to “obtain relevant spatial data for plot demarcation 
and the preparation of accurate cadastral plans”. The participatory survey also enabled 
local landowners to know plot sizes, shapes, and road access to plots (Private surveyor in 
Tamale, Expert interview, 10 January 2021).  
Through the collaboration and partnership in land-use planning, the CLS has been able 
to take inventory of plots in all traditional areas to ensure checks and balances (Official of 
the CLS in Bole, Semi-structured interview, 14 January 2021). The TCPD opined that the 
participatory approach used for land-use planning helped to “record local participants’ 
concerns, visions, interests and needs into the local plan”, which defused local complaints 
and acrimony (Director of TCPD in Bole, Expert interview, 14 January 2021). The village 
chiefs who were the main architects of land-use planning praised the entire planning and 
cadastral survey process because it has helped to clarify plot boundaries of individuals and 
would contribute to reduce scale of land boundary conflicts in the communities (Village 
chief in Tinga, Semi-structure interview, 16 January 2021). The village chiefs lamented that 
the cost of cadastral survey was expensive, and as such, a large truck of communal land was 
not partitioned. Apart from cash, 1% of the 5000 plots demarcated was granted to the private 
surveying firms as part of the administrative cost, which reduced the quantity of plots 
available for sale (Village chief in Tinga, Semi-structure interview, 16 January 2021). The cost 
of survey has been factored into the price of plots. 
Considering that poverty is highest in Northern Ghana, where the majority of the 
rural population’s daily subsistence income falls below $1 per day, many of the poor 
small-scale farmers do not have the capacity to buy plots at higher price [10]. As such, 
small-scale farmers were of the view that plot demarcations are not pro-poor, 
notwithstanding that they can help to secure land tenure (Small-scale farmer in Dokrupe, 
FGD, 24 January 2021). They also argued that the private surveying firm pulled down 
various economic and noneconomic trees and grasses leading to a severe negative impact 
on livestock farmers due to the implementation of the plan without compensation 
packages for the affected farmers (Small-scale farmer in Dokrupe, FGD, 24 January 2021). 
In response, small-scale farmers had to react by appealing to the village chiefs when their 
human rights were violated. This led to a 10% reduction in price per plot for them (Small-
scale farmer in Dokrupe, FGD, 24 January 2021). This finding echoes Lanz et al. [21] who 
indicate that local small-scale farmers are not passive but active local actors in community 
programs or initiative such as rice cultivation. 
5.1.4. Participation of Local Actors in Land Regularization and/or Formalization 
After the plot partitioning, land buyers are obliged to take steps to regularize land 
rights at the customary land secretariat at their cost and formalize property rights at the 
Regional Lands Commission to hold many bundles of sticks or rights (Official of the CLS 
in Bole, Semi-structured interview, 27 January 2021). The customary law of the traditional 
area is that “any land buyer who fails to regularize land rights within 6 months from the 
date of the allocation paper or fails to develop it within two years from the date of grant 
will lose the land rights” (Official of the CLS in Bole, Semi-structured interview, 27 January 
2021). The customary law seeks to prevent acquired lands from being idle at the local level. 
However, “repertoires of domination” by sons of the Bolewura (divisional chief) 
incumbered land regularization efforts at the community level [27] (p.1). For instance, in 
2014, a new customary chief was installed, and the chief’s sons sought to hijack the CLS 
because of the change in “traditional government”, leading to a build-up of tension among 
lineage members, albeit latent (Official of the CLS in Bole, Semi-structured interview, 28 
January 2021). The tension led to the shutting down of the CLS for two consecutive years, 
which negatively affected small-scale farmers’ ability to regularize land rights locally 
(Small-scale farmer in Tinga, FGD, 30 January 2021). The CLS lock down also made it 
largely difficult for the small-scale farmers to formalize property (land) rights at the 
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Regional Lands Commission because without the secretariat’s plot allocation papers, 
formalization cannot happen with respect to land acquired from the customary sector.  
Land buyers who bypassed the CLS to acquire formal title indicate that the processes 
of formalization at the Regional Lands Commission is cumbersome, expensive, 
bureaucratic, and it takes several days to complete the process (Small-scale farmers in 
Tinga, FGD, 23.01.21). Thereby most small-scale farmers with no financial and social 
capital are unable to formalize property rights. It emerged that rich elites who have 
acquired several plots along the main streets and farmlands near the government’s 
protected zone used their social connections with state actors at the Regional Lands 
Commission to obtain title certificates to secure land tenure (Chairman of the land 
committee in Dokrupe, FGD, 13 April 2019). In any case, rich elites would have formalized 
their land rights with or without decentralization due to the economic, political, and social 
benefits of formal title. 
5.2. Talensi 
5.2.1. Participation of Local Actors in Land-Use Planning and Cadastral Survey 
In this case, land-use planning is not well-structured and uncoordinated because of 
the multiple customary authorities who prefer to have land-use planning done separately, 
which does not bode well for local land administration [22]. As such, the village chiefs are 
helpless in land control and management because the tindanas have taken possession of 
communal land, decided land-use planning and derived private benefits from ground 
rent [31,38]. The tindanas reiterate that lands in Talenteng belong to individuals, families, 
and clans, with the tindanas having the oversight responsibility of such lands and not the 
chiefs [26,34,56]. This view is supported by the Supreme Court of Ghana, which ruled that 
the tindanas are the leaders of their communities and must have control over communal 
land [31,34,38]. Therefore, placing the CLS under the care of customary chiefs is not a 
proper institutional design that would stand the test of time in this context [22]. It also 
means that the central government did not ask important questions about the nature of 
land ownership and whether the CLS would be accepted in acephalous communities. The 
observation echoes Biitir et al.’s [22] assertion that the participation and consultation 
processes of the land administration project were not adequate to obtain the needed 
consensus among the diverse landowning authorities before recommending that the CLS 
should be replicated across the country. 
In the context of rising land values, tindanas put their own interests first before those 
of their subjects using various discourses and diverse institutional environment to 
legitimize their action [21]. As a result, land-use planning is directly playing into the hands 
of the tindanas and strengthening their position in land control. Family heads are also the 
sole decision-makers of family land disposition, and have legal backing from Act 1036, 
which permits them to prepare local plans before disposition (Family head in Gbani, Semi-
structured interview, 20 May 2019). Family heads collaborate with the tindanas, district 
assembly, the TCPD, private surveying firms and the Regional Lands Commission for 
support in local plan development and implementation [50]. In this context, there is 
limited participation of local actors because most of the lands are held by clans and 
families who have the leeway to choose who participate in land-use planning (Family 
head in Datuku, Semi-structured interview, 5 June 2019). 
5.2.2. Actors and Their Roles in Land-Use Planning and Cadastral Survey 
The roles of the participant were found to be direct in the arena of land-use planning 
and implementation. The family heads were responsible for sending the applications to 
undertake local plan to the district assembly for approval as well as employ private 
surveying firms to demarcate plot boundaries at a fee (Family head in Datuku, FGD, 5 June 
2019). They also organized private meetings with local stakeholders to deliberate on the 
local plans before implementation. The district assembly reviewed and granted approval 
Land 2021, 10, 948 14 of 20 
 
to the applications submitted by family heads. Without the district assembly’s approval, 
no local plan would be prepared or executed. The review and approval role played by the 
district assembly reinforces it as the highest planning authority at the local level [35]. The 
TCPD ensured that planning standards and guidelines were adhered to (Director of TCPD 
in Tongo, Expert interview, 10 February 2021). The important role of the private surveying 
firm cannot be over emphasized because it translated the local plan drawn on paper on 
the actual ground. The surveying firm recommended that some private structures should 
be demolished before the plan could be executed. The notion of demolishing local 
structures was not embraced by most of the local citizens (Small-scale farmer in Gbani, 
FGD, 15 February 2021). As a result, various expressions were poured out by the different 
actors about cadastral survey activities at the local level.  
5.2.3. The Different Views of Actors in Participatory Land-Use Planning and Cadastral Survey 
The various views of local actors were obtained to understand the challenges 
encountered as well as the prospects for future improvement. It emerged that family heads 
selected few male adults of the family at the expense of women and children in land-use 
planning (Small-scale farmer in Datuku, FGD, 11 February 2021). Under normal circumstances, 
every community member must be given the leeway to participate and decide what they want 
their local plan to look like or contain [35]. According to the TCPD, there was “no prejudiced 
interest for them to exclude” some community members in land-use planning (Director of 
TCPD in Tongo, Expert interview, 15 February 2021). The TCPD indicates that the decision to 
include or exclude was the prerogative of family heads, even though the district assembly had 
implored them to ensure the representation of vulnerable members of the community to 
improve the content of the plan and enhance community ownership (Director of TCPD in 
Tongo, Expert interview, 15 February 2021). The situation where planning authorities exclude 
some vulnerable community members in land-use planning may lead to a lack of community 
ownership and thus result in sustainability crisis [10,40].  
The deficiency of participatory planning led to the production of a layout which did 
not take into consideration pre-existing structures leading to their demolition to pave the 
way for plan implementation (Surveyor in Bolgatanga, Expert interview, 21 February 2021). 
Consequently, the public relation and complaints committee of the district assembly has 
been inundated by several complaints from the local citizens concerning the output of the 
surveying firm (Coordinating director in Tongo, Expert interview, 22 February 2021). It looks 
like the hands of the district assembly are tied because they must adhere to the central 
government’s policy of non-interference in customary land affairs [20,21]. The tindanas and 
family heads are aware of the inability of the district assembly to pin them down and 
therefore, they sometimes deal directly with the Regional Lands Commission in local land 
matters by directing land buyers to the Lands Commission for title certificate. 
5.2.4. Participation in Land Regularization and/or Formalization  
Even though plot demarcations aim to improve the security of tenure of small-scale 
farmers, the number of plots for the small-scale farmers reduced after the work of the 
surveying firm. Small-scale farmers were required to purchase the plots at the prevailing 
market price before regularizing or formalizing land rights. The existence of multiple 
customary authorities and the lack of recognized local structures for local land 
regularization create problems for small-scale farmers. Within clans and families, 
members are competing among themselves for authority to sell and register land rights 
locally [33]. Similarly, customary chiefs and tindanas are competing in land regularization 
because of the fees associated with it (Small-scale farmer in Datuku, FGD, 25 February 
2021). In 2018, the tindanas stopped cosigning land documents for regularization with the 
customary chiefs (Tindana in Datuku, Semi-structured interview, 25 February 2021). The 
tindanas’ fears and suspicions are that, by allowing customary chiefs to cosign land 
documents, for instance, the descendants of these customary chiefs would arrogate to 
themselves the allodial title in the future [22]. It also implied that the capacity of the future 
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children of the tindanas to maintain allodial title may be terminated, resulting in a gradual 
loss of social and material security that is often associated with allodial landholders [22]. 
It is in the light of the above that no tindana would want to accept subordination regarding 
customary land administration [22]. No wonder that the tindanas have retained their 
prerogative to allocate land and do not want to relinquish a part of the rights, obligations, 
or responsibilities with any customary authority (Table 2). In effect, customary chiefs 
failed in their bid to usurp land control in acephalous society [38]. 
The competitions among customary authorities (e.g., tindanas, customary chiefs, clan, 
and family heads) arise because there are no clear guidelines in the distribution of power 
and responsibility at the local level. Besides these challenges, the elitism within the land 
administration and affordability issues dissuades small-scale farmers to formalize land 
rights at the Regional Lands Commission, which threatens security of land tenure 
(Coordinating director in Tongo, Expert interview, 27 February 2021). The comparative 
analysis of the case studies and the emerging issues are discussed in the following section. 
Table 2. Summary of comparative analysis. 
Issues Bole Case Talensi Case 
Land-Use 
Planning 
 High collaboration and 
partnership among local actors 
 Local skills, knowledge, and 
experience development  
 Carried out by family heads 




 Minor errors due to 
participation of local actors in 
land-use planning 
 High cost  
 Technical and complex 
 High irregularities due to 
lack of local participation 
 Many complaints of survey 
outputs  
 Recommended the 
demolishing of structures 
Land sector 
agencies  
 Enhance supervisory and 
monitoring power over 
customary land practices 
 Regulate customary land 




 Local competition among 
lineage members led to the 
shutdown of the CLS for 2 
years 
 Achieved compromises  
 Have knowledge about plot 




 Competition among family 
members and between 
customary chiefs and 
tindanas 
 No compromises made 
 The tindanas have gained 
control over land 
management and benefit 




 Difficult to regularize land 
right due to closure of CLS 
 High cost, bureaucracy and 
“unnecessary” documents 
required discourage property 
rights formalization at the RLC 
 No identifiable local 
structure to regularize land 
rights at the local level 
 Too many complaints of 
elitism within the land 
administration sector   
Source: Qualitative methods and review of relevant literature. 
6. Discussion: Competition in Decentralized Land Administration and Management 
This section analyzes and discusses the politics of decentralization in land 
administration and management in Ghana. Decentralization proponents often assume 
that the withdrawal of the central government from the local level would lead to the 
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empowerment of local citizens through participation in land administration and 
management and ultimately improve tenure security through regularization and 
formalization of property rights [5–7,12,16,19,32]. Local participation in decentralized 
land administration is underpinned by “the norms and values of equity, effectiveness, 
efficiency, power distribution and sustainability” [63,64]. In theory, local participation in 
land administration is contingent on the specific institutional arrangement (or design) and 
how it alters power and distribute responsibilities [1–4,27].  
Our case studies show that the institutional arrangement that performs customary 
land administration and management function is the customary land secretariat [20–26]. 
The secretariat collaborates with the state land sector agencies (e.g., the district 
assembly/spatial planning committee, the TCPD and RLC) and non-state actors (e.g., 
private surveying firms) and are expected to play a complementary role in land 
administration practices to create more effective checks and balances [18,32,57,58]. 
However, in practice, decentralization has increased local competition among local actors 
in land administration with unintended consequences on the land rights of small-scale 
farmers. The findings concur with Van Leeuwen [32] who show that in Uganda, 
decentralization “adds to institutional multiplicity and fuels competition among state and 
non-state authorities and about the rules they apply” (p. 208). As a result of the local 
competition, decentralization has limited impacts in connection with securing the land 
rights (tenure) of small-scale farmers. The CLS set up for decentralized land 
administration and management in Bole for example has been realized only to a limited 
extent because it is inaccessible to local small-scale farmers. In effect, decentralization of 
land administration and management only benefits customary authorities who use the 
CLS to reinforce their position [21,28–32] and contribute to commercialize land 
regularization and formalization thereby reducing the feelings of tenure security among 
those who cannot afford the new land administrative services because of the elitism and 
bureaucracy within the land administration domain [65]. In Ghana, the laws that regulate 
land survey practices (e.g., the 1962 Survey Act 172, the 1989 Survey Regulations 
Legislative Instrument 1444, and the 2008 Lands Commission Act 767) and title 
registration (e.g., the 1962 Land Registry Act 122, the 1986 Land Title Registration Law 
152, and the 2020 Lands Act 1036) are too complex and contradictory [7,58].  
To this end, some scholars propose new approaches to strengthen the land rights or 
tenure security of marginalized small-scale farmers through “formalized arrangement for 
collective tenure (FACT)” that builds on existing common property relations as the way 
forward for inclusive land development [66]. As an institutional innovation, FACT can 
guarantee collective ownership of land to local communities, whilst accommodating the 
different land-use interests of the different actors involved in the land through contractual 
partnership and collective decision-making over distributive outcomes [66]. Perhaps a 
proposed innovative institutional arrangement based on collective tenure could provide a 
better approach for obtaining a better impact of decentralization initiatives at the local level. 
Through FACT strategies of democratic decision-making and the inclusion of marginal 
groups and gender sensitivity in land development, the democratic procedures of land 
administration and management could be upheld, ensuring that checks and balances in land 
are put in place and that nondemocratic decision-making processes leading to elite capture 
are forestalled [66]. Through such newly adopted formalized collective tenure-based land 
administration, decentralization could transform nondemocratic customary institutions 
into democratic apparatuses for land administration. 
7. Conclusions 
Decentralization policy forms part of a broader global ideology and effort of the 
donor international community in support of the principle of subsidiarity to improve local 
participation in land administration and management [5,7,16]. We have demonstrated 
how decentralization in land administration and management failed to foster local 
participation. We have shown that land-use planning and cadastral survey are the key 
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component of land administration and management [7,18,35]. Furthermore, the case 
studies show that customary authorities are strategic actors and behave rationally in land 
administration and management in the context of legal pluralism by performing 
institution shopping to increase control over land [21,28–32,53]. These elites whose 
interest are well-represented through the customary land secretariat might see 
decentralization as a success even though it increases local competition. Nevertheless, 
actual results, such as the empowerment of small-scale farmers in terms of safeguarding 
their land rights are still lacking [3,6,8,32]. Local competition and elitism within the land 
administration domain could be the perils towards decentralization reforms. 
Our empirical analysis shows that decentralization in Ghana is paradoxical because 
competences are transferred to the land sector agencies, customary authorities, and their 
local structures. The nondemocratic practices of the customary authorities including the 
absence of checks and balance weakens democracy and heighten local competition in land 
administration. We strongly suspect that decentralization might have been embraced with 
undue swiftness under the pressure of international donors because central questions 
have not been asked, such as the issue of the reinforcement of nondemocratic customary 
authorities in land administration.  
Instead of proposing decentralization reforms for land administration to improve the 
formalization of property rights and land title, we ask, has the time not come to question 
this broad objective? As a response, Ostrom [67] has already clearly shown that there is a 
range of options between pure state property and pure private property, of which 
customary clan property used to be. To avoid another wave of enclosure, which is 
detrimental to majority, except for a few elites [68], it is also necessary to go beyond 
conventional models of individualization to test formalized collective common property (i.e., 
collective land titling)—which has been neglected, perhaps due to ideological reasons. 
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